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ABSTRACT 
  
In August 2017 a judge sanctioned withdrawal of clinically assisted nutrition and 
hydration from a patient who had been sustained in a vegetative state for twenty-three 
years, finding it “overwhelmingly in his best interests” for treatment to stop, allowing 
him to die. Injured in 1994, this patient had continued to receive life-sustaining 
treatment long after clinicians, and his family, had abandoned any hope for recovery 
and with no evidence that he would have wanted to be kept alive this way. Based on 
interviews with his parents, and the court hearing, we explore how it came about that 
he received this treatment for so long. We contextualize this in relation to our wider 
research about the treatment of severely brain injured patients and ask why, despite 
guidelines, policies and statute concerning best interests decision-making, thousands of 
patients in permanent vegetative states are similarly maintained in England and Wales 
without any formal review of whether continuing clinically assisted nutrition and 
hydration is in their best interests. We consider the implications for ethics, policy and 
practice in relation to patients with prolonged disorders of consciousness more broadly, 
highlighting in particular the actions that need to be taken by clinicians, inspection 
bodies, Clinical Commissioning Groups and Health Boards across England and Wales. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The problem of futile treatment for patients in a permanent vegetative state (PVS) is 
often laid at the door of families who insist on life-sustaining treatments that clinicians 
deem inappropriate. This may arise from families’ failure to accept the devastating 
nature of their relative’s brain injuries or from a ‘natural instinct’ to cling to hope for 
recovery – or because, although they understand the clinical facts, they dispute the 
‘futile’ label, believing that any life is better than none. Even if a family believes that the 
patient would not want to be kept alive and accepts certain ceilings of treatment (e.g. 
no resuscitation or no return to intensive care), they may resist cessation of other 
interventions - most notably clinically assisted nutrition and hydration (CANH – also 
known as ‘artificial’ nutrition and hydration, ANH). Such resistance is often underpinned 
by the powerful symbolic values associated with feeding, fear of a ‘bad death’ and doubt 
about – or rejection of - the ethical/legal distinction between treatment withdrawal and 
active euthanasia [see endnotes 1-3] 
 
The solution is often presented as “effective communication” whereby “the medical team 
gives pertinent information, checks its reception, [and] takes appropriate action in order 
to diminish family anxiety” ([1] pp 919-920). This advice assumes, of course, that the 
medical team is proposing to withhold or withdraw treatment and that families are 
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insisting that life-sustaining treatments are given. Such situations exist, of course, but 
our recent research [4] and experience in supporting family members of patients with 
catastrophic brain injuries [5, 6] highlights a different issue: that of medical teams who 
continue to deliver CANH (and other life-sustaining treatments) long after families come 
to believe that such treatments are unwarranted. We report on one such case here, 
concerning a patient who was maintained in a vegetative state for 23 years.  
 
We contextualize this case study in relation to our broader work with 85 family members 
with experience of having a relative with a prolonged disorder of consciousness, and 
draw out implications for ethics, policy and practice. In particular, we argue that 
explaining the long-term futile treatment of PVS patients as due to intractable pressure 
from families, obscures the legal, institutional, clinical and organizational factors 
underpinning this state of affairs. Estimates suggest that up to 16,000 PVS patient 
[endnote 7] are being maintained in England and Wales today. We argue that an ethical 
response to this situation must go beyond a concern with family psychology and 
communication needs: it is imperative to address key structural issues. 
 
II. MEDICO-LEGAL CONTEXT TO THE CASE 
 
The patient, (we will call him G)1 who is the focus of this article was injured in 1994. In 
2017 the Court of Protection heard evidence that that he had been unconscious ever 
since his injury – and the judge ruled that CANH was “overwhelmingly” not in his best 
interests. These twenty-three years span over two decades of medico-legal development 
and media reporting in which the right not to be subject to futile or unwanted treatment 
has gained increasing attention across Europe, North America and beyond2. G was 
injured in the UK, the year after the landmark Bland  judgment - which ruled that feeding 
tubes are medical treatment and can be withdrawn if not in the patient’s best interests 
- indeed continuation of the treatment will, if not in the best interests of the patient, be 
unlawful3.  
 
At least five similar cases had been subject to court judgments by 19994, by which point 
G’s diagnosis of PVS (originally made in 1995) had been confirmed on several occasions. 
The law required reconsideration of the Bland principles after October 2000 in light of 
the incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights into domestic law (via 
the Human Rights Act 1998) – in particular Article 2 (right to life). Between 2000 and 
2001 Butler-Sloss J heard at least another five additional cases concerning withdrawal 
of CANH from PVS patients in relation to ‘right to life’, and found in each case that 
                                                
 
1 The patient’s full name is in the public domain. However, as his parents would have preferred his 
name not to be published, we have chosen to refer to him only as ‘G’ in this article. This was the initial 
used in the court hearing (Case No. COP 95043878). 
2 Highly publicized cases include: Terri Schiavo (USA), Eluana Englaro (Italy); Re a Ward of Court 
(withholding medical treatment) (No. 2), [1996] 2 I.R. 79; [1995] 2 I.L.R.M. 401; Aruna Shanbaug 
(India).  
3  Airedale NHS Trust v Bland  [1993] A.C. 789; [1993] 2 W.L.R. 316 
4 Frenchay Healthcare NHS Trust v S  [1994] 1 W.L.R. 601; [1994] 2 All E.R. 403. Swindon and 
Marlborough NHS Trust v S (unreported - but see; Guradian Dec 10 1994; Med. L. Rev. 1995, 3(1), 84-
86); Re D (Medical Treatment: Mentally Disabled Patient) [1998] 2 F.L.R. 22; [1998] 2 F.C.R. 178; Re 
H (A Patient) [1998] 2 F.L.R. 36; [1998] 3 F.C.R. 174 
[2017] International Journal of Mental Health and Capacity Law 
 
 
131  
withdrawal was lawful and in patients’ best interests5.  
 
On the medical front, the House of Lords’ Select Committee on Medical Ethics6 had 
recommended, immediately post-Bland, that a code of practice should be developed. A 
working group convened by the Royal College of Physicians (RCP) undertook a review 
and published the Guidelines for the Diagnosis and Management of the Permanent 
Vegetative State in 1996, endorsed by the Conference of Medical Royal Colleges and 
their Faculties in the UK7. These guidelines were revised and updated in 2003 [endnote 
8] and again in 2013 [endnote 9]: both iterations clearly highlight ongoing life-
prolonging treatment for PVS patients as futile8.  
 
In 2007, the implementation of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 incorporated into statute 
the requirement that; “An act done, or decision made, under this Act for or on behalf of 
a person who lacks capacity must be done, or made, in his best interests” (s.1(5) MCA), 
and explicitly required a best interests assessment of all treatments delivered to 
incapacitated patients. Since then a whole raft of academic articles, training initiatives 
and resources have been produced to support professionals in implementing good 
practice and following the law relating to patients in PVS. Refinements and clarifications 
continue to be developed.9  
 
The question we address here, then, is how did it come about that a patient who was 
correctly diagnosed as PVS on multiple occasions (and regularly assessed by 
professionals) continued to receive life-prolonging treatment for more than two decades, 
despite case law, professional guidelines, and statutes that should collectively have led 
professionals – ever since the 1990s - to the view that life-sustaining treatment was 
futile and not in his best interests? We will answer this question with specific reference 
to the particular circumstances of G’s case, but the relevance of the answer goes far 
beyond it, insofar as it enables us to interrogate some of the structural and institutional 
forces that result in thousands of patients in PVS and other prolonged disorders of 
consciousness being maintained with life-sustaining treatment in England and Wales 
today, often without any consideration of the best interests of the individual. 
                                                
5 NHS Trust A v M, NHS Trust B v H [2001] Fam 348; NHS Trust v P  (unreported) see – digest [2000] 
All ER [D] 2363; NHS Trust A v H [2001] 2 F.L.R. 501; [2002] 1 F.C.R. 713; Re G (adult who lacks 
capacity: withdrawal of treatment) (2001) 65 B.M.L.R. 6. 
6 Report of the Select Committee on Medical Ethics (1993-4, HL Paper 21-I) 
7 see – Information from judgment of Sir Stephen Brown P in Re D (Adult Medical Treatment) [1998] 1 
F.L.R. 411; [1998] 1 F.C.R. 498 
8 RCP 2003 guidelines [8] say: “When the diagnosis of a permanent VS has been made … further 
therapy is futile. It merely prolongs an insentient life for the patient, and a hopeless vigil entailing 
major emotional costs for relatives and carers” (para. 3.5). Under such circumstances, the diagnosis 
“should be discussed sensitively with relatives, who should then be given time to consider the 
implications, including the possibility of withdrawing artificial means of administering nutrition and 
hydration” (para 3.6). 
9 These include forthcoming revised guidelines from the British Medical Association (due in Summer 
2018) concerning clinically assisted nutrition and hydration for these (and other) patients without 
capacity to consent to it who may be treated long-term. Consensus statements have also recently been 
produced regarding the treatment of patients with devastating brain injuries in the early days/weeks 
(long before a ‘Permanent’ diagnosis can be given) e.g. stating that ‘where patient-centred outcomes 
are recognized to be unacceptable, regardless of the extent of neurological improvement, then early 
transition to palliative care is appropriate’ [10, p138].  
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III. OUR INVOLVEMENT WITH THE G CASE: SUPPORT, RESEARCH, ANALYSIS 
 
The case history we present here is based on a three and a half hour in-depth narrative 
interview with G’s parents (interviewed as a couple). Our understanding of what they 
told us is also informed by our personal involvement with the family – witnessing at first 
hand some of what they went through. They initially approached us for help in Spring 
2017 as a consequence of our research and outreach in this area (see www.cdoc.org.uk 
for more details about this work). We subsequently supported G’s parents in obtaining 
(yet another) expert diagnostic opinion and helped with the legal procedures. The first 
author (Jenny) accompanied the parents to three best interests meetings, and we both 
attended the court hearing. The second author (Celia) acted as litigation friend for the 
patient. We have had around 30 hours of face-to-face contact with G’s parents10 across 
a range of settings and have also spoken with his clinical and legal teams.  
 
Alert to the difficulties of retrospective self-report data (especially covering such a long 
period), we have cross-checked the parents’ recollections with other sources of 
information so as to further objectify the matter. A draft of this article was sent to various 
lawyers and clinicians involved in the case and we have incorporated relevant feedback 
and corrections. We also locate the parents’ narrative in the context of our broader 
research with a range of families with PVS (and MCS) relatives in order to build up a 
multi-dimensional insight into the varied and complex factors that shapes patient 
pathways. 
 
IV. RESEARCH ETHICS 
 
The broader research programme of which this is a part has been approved by Ethics 
Committees at the Universities of York and Cardiff and received NHS approval from 
Berkshire Research Ethics Committee11. Explicit (written) consent has been obtained for 
all direct quotations not already in the public domain. The patient’s parents were offered 
the opportunity to give feedback on our summary of their account and they support the 
publication of this article and the use of their words. The patient himself lacked capacity 
to give consent – but his parents believe he would have accepted the importance of 
writing about this case.  
 
Our involvement with G’s parents included offering support and information drawn from 
our experience as researchers and as family members with a sister with profound brain 
injuries. We have described elsewhere [endnotes 11, 12] some of the ethical challenges 
raised by our different roles and relationships (as both ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ and as 
both participants and as researchers immersed in a complex medico-legal context). 
Although this much broader experience undoubtedly informs our understanding and 
approach to analysing what happened, we have not explicitly drawn on it in this article. 
In particular, we have not used any privileged information gained as part of our role in 
                                                
 
10 The patient’s wife withdrew from involvement with G in 1997 and divorced him soon afterwards. She 
has not seen G, or had any involvement in decisions about him, for the last twenty years and it was not 
considered appropriate to contact her. 
11 Research Ethics Committee reference number: 12/SC/0495 
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advocating for the patient or his family. 
 
V. MEDICAL ASSESSMENTS AND INTERVENTIONS: A PATIENT ‘LOST IN PLAIN SIGHT’ 
 
G was 24 years old when, in November 1994, he became trapped in a machine at work. 
His oxygen was cut off for around 15 minutes and, when he was released from the 
machine, he went into cardiac arrest. He was left with severe hypoxic brain damage. He 
was resuscitated and rushed to hospital. Subsequent treatment included assisted 
ventilation and a series of surgical interventions over the first six months including 
tracheostomy and PEG insertion, the latter allowing G to be fed via a tube directly into 
his stomach. He was assessed for one year at a specialist rehabilitation centre leading 
to a formal diagnosis of PVS in November 1995, a year after his original injury, a 
diagnosis which was confirmed (after a second placement in another specialist 
rehabilitation centre) by expert reports in 1997, 1998 and 1999.  
 
An insurance settlement, along with Continuing Health Care funding and extensive family 
input, ensured that G received excellent 24-hour care at home after his initial period in 
hospital and rehabilitation. Ongoing medical interventions included the provision of 
CANH and frequent PEG replacements, inoculations against influenza, and antibiotics for 
potentially life-threatening infections. He was regularly seen by a wide range of medical 
professionals as well as having annual assessments at a specialist brain injury 
rehabilitation unit and/or home visits and also reviews by the Health Board responsible 
for his Continuing Health Care funding.  
 
This is not a case where the diagnosis was unclear, nor was the patient ‘warehoused’ 
without appropriate access to rehabilitation and assessment (as can happen in some 
cases [endnote 13].) However, in spite of all this attention, it seems that it was only 
after the parents raised the issue in 2016 that any professionals formally addressed the 
question of why ongoing life prolonging treatment was being provided to this 
permanently unconscious individual. This patient was, it seems, ‘lost in plain sight’.  
 
VI. THE PARENTS’ EXPERIENCE: FROM HOPING FOR RECOVERY TO INITIATING 
DISCUSSION OF TREATMENT WITHDRAWAL 
 
We summarise the parents’ account of their experience in relation to: (a) the initial 
hospital admission; (b) the next two-and-a-half years before they began caring for their 
son at home; (c) two decades of home care; (d) the final 18 months after they raised 
the question of CANH withdrawal. 
 
A. The Early Weeks (November/December 1994) 
 
The parents talk about their son’s initial period in intensive care and high dependency 
as a time of shock, hope and uncertainty: “We lived in the hospital… praying please God, 
please, please God, let him breathe, let him be okay’”. As is typical of many families 
whose relatives survive only to be left in long term vegetative or minimally conscious 
states [endnotes 14, 15], G’s parents now realise that they did not have any 
understanding of the possible outcomes e.g, that their son could breathe but still not be 
“okay”.  
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As far as we can tell from the parents’ memories of what happened, no reasonable 
efforts were made to communicate with them about G’s prognosis or what his future 
might hold - although obviously their experience may not reflect what clinicians intended 
or thought they were doing at the time. The parents recall just one occasion where they 
overheard some discussion about whether life-prolonging interventions should be 
pursued: a surgeon asked G’s wife what she would want to happen if anything went 
wrong in theatre. She replied “Of course I want to save him, he’s only twenty-four… 
That was said in front of us, that we witnessed,” says G’s father, “but there was nothing 
else”. They subsequently encountered that same surgeon outside the hospital lift. G’s 
father thanked him for doing the surgery, “but he tore a strip off me and basically said 
that we’d be sorry”. In retrospect they believe there must have been further 
conversations between this doctor and their son’s wife, and that the doctor wrongly 
assumed that the whole family was resisting his advice not to pursue life-prolonging 
interventions. However, they do not recall ever having been invited to contribute to any 
such discussion and did not feel that the surgeon’s interaction with them outside the lift 
had offered an opportunity to explore options.  
 
B. The First Two and a Half Years (Late 1994 to Mid-1997) 
 
Just before Christmas 1994 their son was moved from the hospital to a specialist 
rehabilitation centre where he stayed for over a year. Again, his parents cannot recall 
any formal discussions about the value (or not) of life-prolonging interventions. There is 
just one passing remark that sticks in their minds: a nurse said, “you’ve had a 
bereavement, you should be having counselling”. G’s mother was shocked by the clear 
message that “we’d lost him, the G we knew,” but says that none of the medical staff 
actually sat down and talked them through their son’s prognosis or the decisions that 
needed to be made. If, in fact, efforts were made to communicate with G’s parents 
about these issues such efforts were clearly not successful.  
 
After more than a year in the rehabilitation centre, G was discharged to the care of his 
wife. His parents were “petrified” and could not accept the implication that “there was 
nothing more they [the doctors] could do”. They still hoped for recovery: 
 
“I remember the doctor saying that when he comes home there’ll be stimulation, cooking smells, 
the vacuum cleaner going, that this could stimulate G perhaps to becoming aware.” (Mother) 
 
They were also encouraged by the ‘stimulation kit’ they were provided with – including 
blocks of wood (to bang either side of G’s head), sandpaper to rub on his skin, and 
bottles of smells to stimulate his senses. 
 
C. Two Decades of Caring at Home (1997-2017) 
 
In 1997 their son was provided with a temporary placement in a second specialist centre 
for yet more assessment. It was after this that G’s wife decided to stop looking after him 
at home and his parents took over. They were given copies of reports clearly stating 
that G was in a permanent vegetative state - PVS, but say they tried to ignore this: “P, 
V, S – three letters we never wanted to utter ourselves to anybody”.  
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In any case, documents produced as part of compensation settlements commonly 
incorporate unquestioned assumptions about continuation of life-prolonging treatment: 
there is often no consideration of treatment-withdrawal, nor any suggestion that the 
treatments provided might be time-limited. Instead, they presume that life will be 
sustained and are oriented towards the nature and cost of the care package. G’s parents 
were left clinging to hope (“like the miracles you read about in the newspaper”) and 
tried to imagine that their son had some level of consciousness. They encouraged his 
care team to do the same:  
 
“He looks as if he’s conscious, doesn’t he? … [We’d say] ‘oh look, he’s looking at you’. And we 
also encouraged that with [the carers], in order to have the best care for C, you know, so that he 
was really being looked after, be it just his body.” (Mother) 
 
Gradually, however, “we realised we weren’t seeing any change … there was just this 
for him. This was his life – no life at all really”. They came to believe that “no-one would 
want this” and reflected on the contrast between his current existence and everything 
their son had once valued - his love of socializing, commitment to community charities 
and the fact that he had put thought into what he wanted after he had “gone” e.g, he 
carried an organ donor card and had taken out life insurance to protect his wife’s 
financial future. Although now certain that he would not have wanted to be kept alive 
in his current state, “we didn’t know there was any option” (Father); “no one has ever 
said, ‘Look, there is another path for [him], he doesn’t have to stay like this’” (Mother). 
 
After some years (they estimate around 10 years after their son’s initial injury), the 
parents nervously initiated a discussion of ceilings of treatment by asking for ‘no return 
to hospital’ and ‘Do Not Attempt Cardio-Pulmonary Resuscitation’ to be put on G’s 
records. This was done but it seems that none of the clinicians looking after G responded 
by inviting a review of other life-prolonging interventions – in particular ongoing clinically 
assisted nutrition and hydration.  
 
D. The Final 18 Months 
 
It was in January 2016 that G’s parents confronted the possibility of withdrawing his 
feeding tube as an option. Such consideration was prompted not by information or 
support from clinicians but by reading a magazine article about another family’s 
experience of this being done for a PVS family member. The parents raised the possibility 
of CANH-withdrawal with their son’s GP who, although initially appearing “startled”, 
offered his full support. The GP moved quickly to refer G to a palliative care 
specialist who visited within a few days, reviewed G and put ceilings of treatment in 
place in respect of antibiotics. Some of the front-line staff who had been caring for G 
over many years apparently supported this move and were relieved to see such decisions 
enacted, but others resisted it – and were very distressed. 
 
From this point the case moved slowly towards court, though it was 18 months after 
this conversation with the GP before it actually went before a judge12. Although a 
                                                
12 We have written elsewhere about the delays typically introduced at this stage [endnotes 4, 5]. In this 
case the first up-to-date independent assessment was not provided until January 2017; it is unclear 
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solicitor was instructed by the Health Board in early 2016, the application was not lodged 
until summer 2017. Most of this delay was caused by the process of getting the evidence 
for the application together – including getting two more, up-to-date, expert 
assessments. The second report was considered advisable after two carers – opposed 
to stopping treatment - raised the possibility that G had some awareness, citing 
examples such as a startle response to loud noises and moving eyes in ways which, they 
believed, were deliberate actions in response to sounds. It is quite common for carers 
to raise such concerns at the point at which treatment-withdrawal becomes an issue. 
The second expert assessment in 2017 confirmed once again - for the sixth time since 
his injury – that G was in a PVS; systematic testing of some of the behaviours reported 
by carers found these to be reflexive or spontaneous,i.e random, rather than prompted 
by external stimuli, and the consultant concluded that there was no evidence of any 
conscious awareness. 
 
When G’s parents initially approached us for support (in 2017, between the first and 
second additional independent diagnostic assessments), they felt that life-prolonging 
treatment had continued for far too long and were frustrated and distressed by the time 
it was taking to get the case to court. They looked back over what had happened in the 
preceding two decades and expressed great concern:  
 
“All we’re doing is looking after G’s body. We’ve just accepted it over the years. But now I feel 
we’ve not done enough. We’ve just cared for him, not thought about what we should do for him.” 
(Mother) 
 
G’s father added: “I worry that we have been negligent”, but he also drew attention to 
the responsibility of clinicians to raise CANH-withdrawal. 
 
“We were going over for a yearly checkup at [the specialist centre]. They’d check ‘What’s his 
medicine?’, ‘What’s his weight?’. And we’d try with the awareness kit: sandpaper, oils, wool. And 
the doctor said ‘keep on doing that if it keeps you happy but don’t beat yourself up’. He obviously 
knew – but still nothing was said. They probably thought we were in denial and we probably were. 
But doctors have these seminars – they have research papers come through – shouldn’t they have 
known? Shouldn’t they have said something? Why didn’t anyone say anything?” (Father) 
 
VII. DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
It seems that there were significant failures to follow relevant case law, guidelines and 
statute in this case. These apparent failings date back initially to the 1990s: there was 
no formal consultation with the parents when clinicians made decisions about life-
prolonging treatment while their son was in hospital or when he was subsequently 
transferred to specialist assessment settings. Even once the PVS diagnosis was 
confirmed for the fourth time (in 1999) and G’s parents took on the responsibility of 
caring for him at home, clinicians apparently still failed to initiate such discussions with 
                                                
why this took so long given that the parents had raised the issue a year earlier. The second 
assessment came six months later, delayed, in part, by the fact that the most relevant specialist 
service had a long waiting list (especially for patients with tracheostomies). This was eventually 
resolved by transferring G to yet another specialist centre (the third specialist unit to take him – and 
one outside the usual area) – a positive example of flexible responses to circumvent the possibility of 
drawing out the whole process still further.  
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them – and those responsible for determining their son’s best interests (which includes 
a range of health care commissioners/providers/inspectors) – seem not to have made 
any such determinations.  
 
A. Organisational Communication, Missed Opportunities and Treatment-By-Default 
 
One issue is apparent, failures in communication between the different professionals 
and organisations involved in the 1990s (such that the repeated diagnoses of G as being 
in a PVS) may not have been communicated to the commissioning/funding body: if this 
is so then there cannot have been appropriate consideration of G’s best interests, 
including (but not limited to) the question of whether continuing CANH was in his best 
interests. It seems no one joined the dots between the multiple confirmed PVS diagnoses 
and best interests decision-making.  
 
From the parents’ reports it is also evident that opportunities to question the assumption 
that treatments would be provided indefinitely were missed at routine clinical 
interventions and at regular reviews over the years that followed. These opportunities 
included frequent PEG replacement by a specialist who regularly came to their home, 
the annual reviews when G was taken to the specialist rehabilitation centre (assessments 
which went on for many years), and also the annual reviews carried out by the Health 
Board assessing his care needs. Another opportunity for professionals to comply with 
guidelines and statute was missed when G’s parents initiated discussions about whether 
some life-prolonging interventions (e.g, CPR, returns to hospital) could be 
withheld/withdrawn. At that point, nobody seems to have used the opportunity to raise 
the issue of other life-prolonging interventions – in particular CANH.  
 
Overall, what we see in this case is that instead of treatments being decided by reference 
to G’s best interests, an entire infrastructure and reams of official documentation 
supported treatment-by-default. This was implemented in the complete absence of any 
evidence that it was in his best interests, and in the face of ample evidence that it was 
futile and possibly unlawful – and long after his parents had come to believe he would 
not have wanted his life prolonged.  
 
G’s story is exceptional for the length of time he was sustained in PVS - and also for the 
fact that court proceedings were finally initiated which allowed his death. But the failings 
in G’s case echo what we have found in our wider research [endnotes 3-6]. Families, 
and staff too, feel trapped in a system of ‘care delivery’ which seems to have its own 
logic and momentum. It seems that some of the health care workers involved in G’s care 
had been deeply troubled by the situation but did not know there were options, or did 
not feel they had the skills to challenge what was happening, or felt it was not their 
place to raise the question of whether or not continued life-prolonging treatment was 
right. Others may have simply found the option of CANH-withdrawal ethically 
unacceptable. Even once the parents initiated the discussion and the Health Board 
started proceedings there was still an additional delay before the case reached court. As 
a result of all these factors G’s human right not to receive futile and unwanted treatment 
was breached for decades. 
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B. Lessons Around Support/Training Needs 
 
There are important lessons to be learned from G’s case (and other cases of prolonged 
disorders of consciousness more generally across the UK) including the following: 
 
a. It is essential that family and staff understand the medico-legal context and 
have access to high-quality information about clinical, social and ethical issues 
concerning treatment of this patient group 
 
b. Families must be given appropriate information and support – including support 
over time and across different settings (including when caring for a patient at 
home)  
 
c. Staff working in this area may need special training and support to address 
their own concerns and to develop the skills to have difficult conversations.  
 
d. It is also important that staff have training and understand the responsibilities 
of their role (which includes acting in the best interests of patients as laid out 
in the Mental Capacity Act 2005, its associated Code of Practice, and in 
professional guidelines).  
 
But repeated calls for such lessons to be learned - and the production of materials to 
support best interests decision making13 - seem to have produced only very slow change. 
We think it is time to address key structural problems including the legal context and 
how care is inspected, commissioned and delivered. 
 
C. The Legal Context 
 
One such structural problem - the long-standing apparent requirement for judicial review 
of these treatment decisions in England and Wales - is already being addressed. We 
have discussed elsewhere the ways in which the belief – buttressed by Court of 
Protection Practice Direction 9E - that court applications are mandatory before CANH 
can be withdrawn from patients in permanent vegetative and minimally conscious states 
has acted as a deterrent to withdrawal [endnotes 4, 5]. Our analysis has highlighted 
how this can mean that many patients have continued to receive treatment that is not 
in their best interests either as they await court hearings, or because their case is not 
brought before the court at all. In an important recent development (which came, on 1 
December 2017, just too late for G) the Court of Protection Rules Committee withdrew 
Practice Direction 9E.  
 
This move away from the apparent need for court approval has also been clear in recent 
legal judgments.14 A series of judges have made statements that there is no requirement 
                                                
13 For examples of such resources see http://cdoc.org.uk/publications/resources-for-families-and-
practitioners/ 
14 NHS Trust v Mr Y (By his Litigation Friend, the Official Solicitor) and Mrs Y  [20017] EWHC 2866 (QB)  
(available at www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/QB/2017/2866.html); Director of Legal Aid Casework & Ors 
v Briggs [2017] EWCA Civ 1169; [2018] 2 W.L.R 152 (available at: www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/ 
Civ/2017/1169.html); and M v A Hospital [2017] EWCOP 19; [2018] 1 W.L.R 465. (available at: 
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on treating clinicians to seek the court’s prior approval to withdraw CANH for a patient 
in PVS or MCS where existing professional clinical guidance has been followed and where 
the treating team and those close to the patient are all in agreement that it is not in the 
patient’s best interests to continue such treatment. A joint statement by the British 
Medical Association, the Royal College of Physicians and the General Medical Council 
underlines this point [endnote 19] and the Supreme Court hearing on this matter (Re. 
Y, UKSC 2017/0202) in February 2018 should remove any final doubt about the 
circumstances under which court applications must be made before CANH can be 
withdrawn.  
 
D Ensuring that Best Interests Considerations are Integrated Into the way Care is 
Inspected, Commissioned and Delivered  
 
Although removal of the perceived need to go to court will be an important step towards 
getting rid of one source of delay, it is clear that this will not completely resolve the 
problem of treatment-by-default for patients in permanent vegetative states – or indeed 
in other prolonged disorders of consciousness e.g, vegetative states that are not yet 
diagnosed as ‘permanent’ or minimally conscious states. Our analysis of the G case (and 
other cases we have examined) shows that additional changes are required to ensure 
that all decisions about these patients are the outcome of robust best interests 
procedures.  
 
We recommend that organisations responsible for inspecting care (e.g. the Care Quality 
Commission in England and the Healthcare Inspectorate in Wales) should hold those 
responsible for providing care accountable for high quality best interests decision-
making. This could include routinely asking for evidence of best interests decision-
making for CANH for patient in a prolonged disorder of consciousness.  
 
We also recommend that those responsible for funding and commissioning care (Clinical 
Commissioning Groups in England; Health Boards in Wales) should take responsibility 
for ensuring that all treatment they commission is in the best interests of the patient – 
and require this to be clearly supported by the correct documented evidence. Alongside 
this, it is essential that they provide the appropriate resources to allow this to happen, 
including access to independent expert second opinions as required, and it is vital to 
ensure that CCGs and Health Boards know where patients are – and that information is 
exchanged and their treatment is appropriately co-ordinated.  
 
Despite some reorganization of the health service and despite new guidelines and 
procedures, it is clear that what happened to G is probably still happening to other PVS 
patients today. Although Health Boards and Clinical Commissioning Groups provide the 
funding for treatment of PVS/MCS patients, it seems they do not know how many PVS 
(or MCS) patients are being maintained on their books. Clinicians regularly tell us that 
this is the case and this is supported by the results of a Freedom of Information request: 
only 62 of the 238 health authorities approached by the BBC could provide any 
                                                
www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCOP/2017/19.html).   
 
[2017] International Journal of Mental Health and Capacity Law 
 
 
140  
information on how many such patients were their responsibility [endnote 16]. In 
addition, Health Boards and CCGs do not have any process of monitoring or assessing 
this ongoing treatment. 
 
Change is urgently needed to ensure the appropriate care for patients like G. On the 
basis of our analysis of this case (and others), we support recent recommendations 
[endnote 17] for implementation of a clinical pathway based on the principles embodied 
in the Mental Capacity Act 2005 combined with the use of time-limited treatment-trials. 
This includes the following recommendations: 
 
Service commissioners should create and fund a centralized register, and require all services to 
put people entering (or already in) a prolonged disorder of consciousness on this register. 
 
Patients must have access to the appropriate level of diagnostic and prognostic expert assessment. 
By ‘appropriate’ level of diagnosis/prognosis we mean to the level of precision or (un)certainty 
that the patient would have wanted to ensure their wishes can be respected in best interests 
decisions about them. This does not necessarily mean fine-tuning the prognosis indefinitely but 
does mean access to the best high-quality information available at the time.  
 
Patients must have access to timely assessment and reassessment. By ‘timely’ we mean as 
specified in the latest guidelines (e.g. RCP (2013) at time of writing, and the new BMA guidelines 
due out in Spring/Summer 2018.  
 
Each patient (and their family) should have an assigned care coordinator, providing continuity and 
following the patient over time and across diverse services: this person’s role could include high-
level understanding of the issues for VS/MCS patients, responsibility for ensuring that accurate 
information is available to the right people and appropriately entered into decision-making 
processes, and support for the family in navigating the systems responsible for the care of their 
relative. [See 18]  
 
There needs to be a clear line of responsibility for decision-making. Although – according to s. 5 
of the Mental Capacity Act – everyone who “does an act in connection with the care or treatment 
of another person [who lacks capacity to consent]” is responsible for ensuring such treatment is 
in the patient’s best interests. This does not seem to be happening in practice. Currently there 
seems to be some doubt about who is responsible for the decision to continue administration of 
CANH for patients in prolonged disorders of consciousness and the responsibility for the act of 
giving the treatment is, in practice, diffused between different persons/bodies, none of whom may 
'own' the decision. The responsible clinician for patients cared for at home (like G) or in long-term 
care homes is often considered to be the GP, who may see the patient infrequently and only when 
they become ill (e.g. with a lung infection): the GP may not feel they have the relevant specialist 
expertise or authority to question ongoing CANH and even the clinician replacing a PEG may not 
take responsibility for a best interests assessment (although they, of course, should). The 
funding/commissioning organisation is clearly identified as carrying key responsibility in the RCP 
guidelines [9] but often sees themselves as dependent on medical advice as to what treatments 
should be funded and do not in practice seem to necessarily apply best interests considerations 
to that advice. Often both health care staff and organisations abdicate responsibility, quite 
wrongly, waiting for ‘the family’ to raise questions about withdrawal. 
 
A key underlying necessary condition here is initiating and following best interests 
decision-making procedures for all patients in prolonged disorders of consciousness. We 
recommend that commissioners should require services to hold regular best interests 
meetings that are properly, skillfully and sensitively conducted, and documented to 
comply with the Mental Capacity Act. This includes: 
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Regular best interests meetings should be backed up by appropriate information for, and support 
for families (and staff as necessary) - including access to independent second opinions as 
appropriate. 
 
Staff should not rely on consulting just one person acting as ‘next of kin’. Instead, as specified by 
the MCA Code of Practice, the decision-maker has a duty to consult (1) anyone named before loss 
of capacity (2) anyone caring for the person (3) close relatives and friends and (4) any legally 
appointed attorney or deputy (MCA Code of Practice, para 5.49).  
 
Meetings should explicitly address what the patient would have wanted (not just asking family 
members what they want, or asking them to make the decision) 
 
Such best interests meetings should explicitly address whether or not each and every treatment 
is in the patient’s best interests – including asking that question about CANH  
 
It should be made clear that discussing treatment-withdrawal options is not about ‘abandoning’ 
the patient or withdrawing ‘care’: it is about ensuring appropriate, person-centred care. The 
discussion should include information about palliative pathways and accurate information about 
other families’ experiences [20].  
 
Best Interests decision processes and outcomes should be properly documented  
 
We agree with Professor Derick Wade that if commissioners: “funded a register and only 
paid providers if appropriate standards derived from national guidelines were met, then 
the situation could be transformed” [endnote 14].  
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
In conclusion, patients in prolonged disorders of consciousness (whether in a prolonged 
coma, vegetative or minimally conscious state) are extremely vulnerable and there are 
many challenges confronting their families who are faced with excruciating loss, 
accompanied by early prognostic uncertainties and conditions which are very difficult to 
understand. Families have to negotiate complex issues relating to their own wishes, their 
relative’s prior (and possible/imagined current) wishes and the likely persistence of hope 
for recovery fuelled by media (mis)representations and hype around scientific 
‘breakthroughs’ and nurtured by the well-intentioned impulses of friends and 
acquaintances, and some health care staff whose motivation is to offer comfort. The 
healthcare service needs to provide a high level of care, support and governance to 
ensure that patients’ best interests are served and to address the serious problem of 
futile/unwanted treatment delivered in England and Wales to some of this patient group. 
It should not be left to families – like G’s parents here, or the wife of minimally conscious 
Paul Briggs [6] - to raise the question of, or advocate for, treatment withdrawal. 
 
Dealing with this problem needs to move beyond scapegoating families as the source of 
the problem – or a focus on simply providing information and support to them (although 
this is a crucial part of the jigsaw) - and towards a recognition that the institutionalized 
provision of long-term treatment-by-default normalizes sustaining life in PVS making it 
difficult for families (or staff) to consider alternatives [21].  
 
What happened to G, and to his family, is a stark illustration of what can go wrong for 
years, or even decades, when the system fails a patient. As his parents comment, if 
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lessons can be learned from his case, that is one of the few things that can mean that 
the suffering and the futility of it all is more than “just a waste”. We hope that the 
analysis presented here, and suggestions for policy/practice change can be part of G’s 
legacy.  
 
Postscript:  
Organisations involved in G’s case have responded proactively to the concerns raised in 
this article. An independent review of his notes has been commissioned and there are 
plans to create a working group to review current guidance and pathways for similar 
patients. 
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